0 Snir, Eli Hitt, Lorin M 2004 Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce 14 1 61-88 information economics, contracts, incentives, agency theory, outsourcing, IT project risk management The growth in the information technology (IT) services market and the increasing tendency of firms to outsource some or all of their IT functions necessitate better mechanisms for selecting IT vendors. For most projects, there are a multitude of potential vendors that differ in quality and other aspects that are difficult to assess at the time of contracting. In addition, many projects have outcomes that are difficult to measure or verify by outside parties – as a result, strategies that require observability of outcome, such as incentive contracting, only provide limited benefits in vendor selection and in some cases can be ineffective or counterproductive. This paper presents an alternative mechanism for selecting high quality vendors using a two-stage contract. In the first stage, the client engages a vendor for a pilot project and observes the outcome. Using this observation, the client makes a decision on whether to continue the project to the second stage or terminate the project on pre-specified terms. By setting compensation for the pilot sufficiently low, and establishing a threshold performance level for continuation, the client can offer a contract that is only attractive to high quality vendors. Using game theoretic analysis we find that this contract performs better for the client than random selection among seemingly equally qualified vendors. This mechanism is useful in settings where vendor quality is uncertain, and especially in situations where a pilot project is undertaken for other reasons (such as demonstrating technical feasibility), where the benefits of this contracting mechanism can be realized at little incremental cost. JOCEC version is scanned fulltext (warning: large file). ICIS version is PDF but only an extended abstract.